Growth momentum set to lose some steam
Economic growth will decelerate marginally in 2026. Household consumption (accounting for 58% of GDP in 2024) should expand at a slower pace, although it will remain the main contributor to growth. The trend is supported by the continuation of the gradual disinflationary process, combined with the easing of monetary policy (the policy rate has converged towards neutral), declining unemployment rate and rising real wages. Similarly, the increase in public spending (15% of GDP) is also likely to lose some steam on back of the new government’s focus on fiscal consolidation. Conversely, gross fixed investment (24% of GDP) should accelerate over the same period amid relatively better financing conditions (on the domestic and external fronts) and higher copper prices. According to the Capital Goods Corporation survey for Q3 2025, the five-year nominal investment forecast is estimated at USD 79 billion—roughly 24% of 2024 GDP—with 79% coming from the private sector and 21% from the public sector, primarily in mining, energy and public works.
A planned joint venture between Chilean state copper giant Codelco and local producer SQM to develop lithium received final approval from China’s antitrust regulator in November 2025, clearing the way for operations in the Atacama salt flat. The deal, which was announced nearly two years ago, is part of a government strategy to expand state involvement and boost output. Importantly, President-elect José Antonio Kast, in contrast with the outgoing government, endorses greater private-sector participation, supporting amending the Mining Code to allow reversing the current state-centric approach.
Concerning exports (30% of GDP), despite the favourable terms of trade, Chile should post somewhat lower export growth in 2026 as demand from its main trading partner, China – the destination of about 39% of foreign sales – should continue to gradually lose steam. Last, while the La Niña weather phenomenon is expected to hit in early 2026, it should not be very intense and only last for a short time. In Chile, La Niña typically brings cooler temperatures and less rainfall, often causing drought. It cools Pacific waters along the coast, intensifying upwelling and boosting nutrients, which increases plankton and favours species like anchoveta and sardine, which supports industrial fishing. However, warmer-water species may migrate, thereby hurting artisanal fishing. Prolonged drought remains a concern for agriculture (3% of GDP) and mining (12% of GDP).
Twin deficits to narrow somewhat
The current account shortfall is expected to narrow in 2026. The trade balance surplus (6.1% of GDP in 2024) should widen, reflecting relatively faster growth of exports than imports. While external purchases will continue to be supported by robust imports of capital goods (on back of a strong investment pipeline), the slowdown in growth will be underpinned by a high comparison base and durably weak energy prices, thereby contributing to a slightly lower energy trade deficit. Similarly, the services deficit could narrow slightly compared to 2025 (2.8% of GDP), helped by lower maritime and air transport costs. In contrast, the primary income deficit (5.1% of GDP) could rise marginally as a result of durably upbeat profit repatriation owing to high copper prices. Foreign direct investment (3.8% of GDP) should fully cover the current account deficit. Importantly, Chile's negative net international investment position stood at -19% of GDP in Q2 2025, softened mainly by the existence of significant pension fund investments abroad (31% of GDP in June 2025). External debt stood at 75% of GDP in Q2 2025, 65% of which is owed by the private sector.
On the fiscal front, the nominal deficit (including interest payments) is expected to decrease slightly in 2026. The budget bill for 2026 is forecasting a 1.7% increase in real expenditure in annual terms, while revenues are expected to increase by 7.7% over the same period. In the latter case, policymakers will rely on expected moderate economic growth and an increase in revenues from mining royalties, especially copper and lithium, thanks to new contracts and higher production. Last, the gross public debt ratio should remain moderate in 2026. The internal portion (70% of the total, derived solely from the central government) is denominated in pesos or UF (a development unit, with a peso indexed to inflation), while the external portion is in dollars (83%), euro (10%) and other miscellaneous currencies (7%). Of significant importance, President-elect Kast has proposed a USD 6 billion spending cut within 18 months (equivalent to 1.9% of 2024 GDP) generated as follows: USD 1.8 billion from eliminating misuse of public resources, USD 2.1 billion by improving state efficiency and streamlining bureaucracy, and USD 2.1 billion by imposing general austerity on government expenditures. However, implementing the plan will be a challenge because 85% to 90% of public spending is legally mandated, meaning substantial cuts would require legislative reforms and political agreements (even if Kast seeks at least partial support from Congress). Moreover, implementing spending cuts of this magnitude before 2027 is unlikely as the 2026 budget was passed by the outgoing administration. Last, although Kast has promised not to touch social benefits, it will be hard to avoid making an impact given the scale of the adjustment.
Chile veers to the right
In December 2025, Chile held the presidential election run-off in which conservative candidate José Antonio Kast of the Partido Republicano won 58% of the vote, defeating the incumbent leftist coalition candidate Jeannette Jara, who secured 42%. Kast will begin his four-year term on 11 March 2026. His victory can be attributed to the shift in public mood from inequality and pensions during the last two electoral cycles towards crime and violence. His campaign took a much tougher stance on security and undocumented migration than Jara’s, and advocated measures such as physically and technologically sealing illegal crossings, building border walls, the mass deportation of undocumented migrants (at their own expense), constructing new high-security prisons, and imposing harsher sentences on gang members and criminals. While Chile remains one of Latin America’s safest countries, crime has surged in recent years. The homicide rate has more than doubled—from 2.32 per 100,000 in 2015 to 6.0 in 2024—and kidnappings hit a record 868 cases in 2024, with the State Attorney’s office linking 40% to organised crime. This spike coincided with a wave of undocumented Venezuelan migration, which grew from 1,200 in 2018 to 252,600 thousand in 2023. The backlash against immigration has increasingly merged with the crime debate. Significant increases in both migration and crime after the pandemic created dual shocks for a country unaccustomed to either. Chile’s northern desert borders with Peru and Bolivia have become a big flashpoint. Its porous borders and major duty-free port of Iquique were largely off the radar of international criminal organisations until large scale immigration drew their attention.
Regarding economic policy, Kast supports deregulation, lower business taxes (proposed corporate tax reductions to 20% from the current 27% and 23% imposed on large and medium firms), encouraging private technological innovation (including partnerships with global tech firms), and measures to boost mining which include reducing royalties and streamlining permit procedures to reduce delays and attract foreign capital. He also endorses the easing of labour restrictions by making hiring and firing more flexible and limiting union power. In Congress, the shift to the right was less pronounced than in the presidential race. All 155 seats in the Lower House and 23 of the 50 Senate seats were contested on the same day as the first-round of the presidential election in November 2025. As none of the declared coalitions holds an outright majority in either house, governance will require negotiation across the political spectrum. The right-wing and centre-right bloc increased its representation in the lower house from 73 to 76 seats, short of a majority. However, if the centrist Partido de la Gente (PDG) aligns with them in the house, the block could surpass the four-sevenths supermajority threshold, enabling constitutional amendments. Meanwhile, the outgoing coalition’s number fell from 74 to 61 seats, and the Greens held 3 seats. In the Senate, the right-wing coalition will control 25 seats, while the outgoing coalition will have 20—potentially reaching 25 with support from the Green Party and left-wing independents. This means 25–25 ties may become frequent in the new legislature. Chile’s Senate has no tie-breaking vote; if it rejects a bill approved by the Chamber of Deputies, a Joint Committee may be convened to resolve the disagreement; otherwise, the bill will be dismissed.
Kast is expected to be pragmatic in foreign policy. While ideologically closer to right-wing leaders such as US President Donald Trump and Argentina’s Javier Milei, he is likely to maintain cordial ties with China given Chile’s heavy reliance on Chinese demand—particularly for copper. With the US, cooperation is expected to deepen on regional drug-related crime and security. As for Argentina, Kast made his first foreign visit as President-elect to the neighbouring country in December 2025, where he endorsed a joint agenda with Javier Milei focused on promoting trade and investment, highlighting collaboration in key sectors such as mining, infrastructure and technology. Overall, Kast supports continuity in Chile’s international integration, seeking to expand access to global markets. He also favours reducing operational friction and transaction costs, and improving logistics and infrastructure to enhance export performance. Regarding Venezuela, Kast has openly supported any US intervention aimed at ending what he calls a “narco-dictatorship.” He stated that Chile would back such efforts, arguing they would benefit not only Venezuela but the entire Latin American region. He also proposed creating a humanitarian corridor to facilitate the organised return of Venezuelan migrants as part of his broader regional cooperation strategy. As for Colombia, Kast has made fewer direct comments, but his election sparked strong criticism from Colombian President Gustavo Petro.

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